Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):187 - 201 (2004)

Authors
Christoph Jäger
University of Innsbruck
Abstract
According to Fred Dretske's externalist theory of knowledge a subject knows that p if and only if she believes that p and this belief is caused or causally sustained by the information that p. Another famous feature of Dretske's epistemology is his denial that knowledge is closed under known entailment. I argue that, given Dretske's construal of information, he is in fact committed to the view that both information and knowledge are closed under known entailment. Hence, if it is true that, as Dretske also believes, accepting closure leads to skepticism, he must either embrace skepticism or abandon his information theory of knowledge.
Keywords epistemic closure  Dretske  skepticism  information theory of knowledge
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DOI 10.1007/s10670-004-9283-5
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References found in this work BETA

Elusive Knowledge.David K. Lewis - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.
Solving the Skeptical Problem.Keith DeRose - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (1):1-52.
How to Be a Fallibilist.Stewart Cohen - 1988 - Philosophical Perspectives 2:91-123.

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Citations of this work BETA

Shutting Dretske’s Door.Nicholas Shackel - 2006 - Erkenntnis 64 (3):393-401.

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Dretske on Knowledge Closure.Steven Luper - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (3):379 – 394.
Knowledge and Deductive Closure.James L. White - 1991 - Synthese 86 (3):409 - 423.
Dretske on Knowledge and Content.Olav Gjelsvik - 1991 - Synthese 86 (March):425-41.

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