Synthese 199 (1-2):1185-1205 (2020)

Authors
Abstract
We discuss the social-epistemic aspects of Catherine Elgin’s theory of reflective equilibrium and understanding and argue that it yields an argument for the view that a crucial social-epistemic function of epistemic authorities is to foster understanding in their communities. We explore the competences that enable epistemic authorities to fulfil this role and argue that among them is an epistemic virtue we call “epistemic empathy”.
Keywords coherence  understanding  epistemic authority  reflective equilibrium  epistemic empathy
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1007/s11229-020-02776-z
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Morality of Freedom.Joseph Raz - 1986 - Philosophy 63 (243):119-122.

View all 68 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

What’s Epistemic About Epistemic Paternalism?Elizabeth Jackson - 2022 - In Jonathan Matheson & Kirk Lougheed (eds.), Epistemic Autonomy. New York: Routledge. pp. 132–150.
On Understanding and Testimony.Federica Isabella Malfatti - 2021 - Erkenntnis 86 (6):1345-1365.
An Epistemic Case for Empathy.Justin Steinberg - 2014 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (1):47-71.
Can the Aim of Belief Ground Epistemic Normativity?Charles Côté-Bouchard - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (12):3181-3198.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2020-07-14

Total views
93 ( #127,235 of 2,520,805 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
39 ( #22,148 of 2,520,805 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes