Why to believe weakly in weak knowledge: Goldman on knowledge as mere true belief
Grazer Philosophische Studien 79 (1):19-40 (2009)
Abstract
In a series of influential papers and in his groundbreaking book Knowledge in a Social World Alvin Goldman argues that sometimes “know” just means “believe truly” (Goldman 1999; 2001; 2002b; Goldman & Olsson 2009). I argue that Goldman's (and Olsson's) case for “weak knowledge”, as well as a similar argument put forth by John Hawthorne, are unsuccessful. However, I also believe that Goldman does put his finger on an interesting and important phenomenon. He alerts us to the fact that sometimes we ascribe knowledge to people even though we are not interested in whether their credal attitude is based on adequate grounds. I argue that when in such contexts we say, or concede, that S knows that p , we speak loosely. What we mean is that S would give the correct answer when asked whether p . But this doesn't entail that S knows that her answer is right or that S knows that p . My alternative analysis of the Hawthorne-Goldman-Olsson examples preserves the view that knowledge requires, even in the contexts in question, true (firm) belief that is based on adequate grounds.Author's Profile
DOI
10.1163/18756735-90000855
My notes
Similar books and articles
Reliabilism and the Value of Knowledge.Alvin I. Goldman & Erik J. Olsson - 2009 - In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 19--41.
Reliabilism and the extra value of knowledge.Wayne A. Davis & Christoph Jäger - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (1):93-105.
In defense of the conditional probability solution to the swamping problem.Erik J. Olsson - 2009 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 79 (1):93-114.
Reliable Knowledge and Social Epistemology: Essays on the Philosophy of Alvin Goldman and Replies by Goldman.Gerhard Schurz, Markus Werning & Alvin I. Goldman (eds.) - 2009 - Rodopi.
Truth and weak knowledge in goldman’s veritistic social epistemology.Elke Brendel - 2009 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 79 (1):3-17.
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