Mengzi and the Archimedean Point for Moral Life

Journal of Chinese Philosophy 41 (1-2):74-90 (2014)

Authors
Xinyan Jiang
University of Redlands
Abstract
“The Archimedean point for moral life” discussed in this article refers to the starting point of one's moral reasoning and what ultimately makes moral life possible. The article intends to show that Mengzi's doctrine of the Four Beginnings may throw some light on our search for such an Archimedean point. More specifically, it argues for the following: Mengzi's doctrine of the Four Beginnings actually takes moral sentiments as the Archimedean point for moral life; Mengzi's view of the starting point of moral reasoning and the ultimate ground for moral life not only can be empirically supported to a great extent, but also logically plausible
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DOI 10.1111/1540-6253.12092
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