Jeremiah Joven Joaquin
De La Salle University
In “A neglected reply to Prior’s dilemma” Beall [2012] presents a Weak Kleene framework where Prior’s dilemma for Hume’s no-ought-fromis thesis fails. It fails in the framework because addition, the inference rule that one of its horns relies on, is invalid. In this paper, we show that a more general result is necessary for the viability of Beall’s proposal – a result, which implies that Hume’s thesis holds in the proposed framework. We prove this result and thus show that Beall’s proposal is indeed viable.
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DOI 10.12775/llp.2019.028
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References found in this work BETA

The Autonomy of Ethics.A. N. Prior - 1960 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 38 (3):199 – 206.
Off-Topic: A New Interpretation of Weak-Kleene Logic.Jc Beall - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Logic 13 (6).
Barriers to Implication.Gillian Russell & Greg Restall - 2010 - In Charles Pigden (ed.), Hume on Is and Ought. Palgrave MacMillan.
The Autonomy of Ethics.A. Prior - 1960 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 38:197.

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