Dissolving the Is-Ought problem: An essay on moral reasoning

Abstract
The debate concerning the proper way of understanding, and hence solving, the “is-ought problem” produced two mutually exclusive positions. One position claims that it is entirely impossible to deduce an imperative statement from a set of factual statements. The other position holds a contrary view to the effect that one can naturally derive an imperative statement from a set of factual statements under certain conditions. Although these two positions have opposing views concerning the problem, it should be evident that they both accept that the “is-ought problem” is concerned with the deducibility of imperative statements from factual statements. Later I will argue that this should not be our concern when we try to make sense of the way we reason about morality.
Keywords moral reasoning
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Translate to english
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
The Problem of Protocol Statements and Schlick's Concept of "Konstatierungen".Zhenming Zhai - 1990 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990:15 - 23.
Reasoning and Pragmatics.Guy Politzer & Laura Macchi - 2000 - Mind and Society 1 (1):73-93.
The Moral Evil Demons.Ralph Wedgwood - 2010 - In Richard Feldman & Ted Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford University Press.
Natural Laws and the Problem of Provisos.Marc Lange - 1993 - Erkenntnis 38 (2):233Ð248.
Legal Statements and Normative Language.Duarte D'Almeida Luís - 2011 - Law and Philosophy 30 (2):167-199.
Problem Representation for Refinement.Halil A. Guvenir & Varol Akman - 1992 - Minds and Machines 2 (3):267-282.
Added to PP index
2010-02-05

Total downloads
1,112 ( #635 of 2,193,222 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
113 ( #903 of 2,193,222 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature