Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (4):577-578 (1998)

Abstract
Atran's putative module for folk biology is evaluated with respect to evidence from patients showing category-specific impairments for living kinds. Existing neuropsychological evidence provides no support for the primacy of categorization at the generic species level. We outline reasons for this and emphasize that such claims should be tested using inductive reasoning tasks.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1017/s0140525x98311279
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 52,739
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Moderately Massive Modularity.Peter Carruthers - 2003 - In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press. pp. 67-89.
Moderately Massive Modularity.Peter Carruthers - 2003 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 53:67-89.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Innateness, Universality, and Domain-Specificity.Gregg E. A. Solomon - 1998 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (4):588-589.
Taxonomic Ranks, Generic Species, and Core Memes.Scott Atran - 1998 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (4):593-604.
Faculty Before Folk.Justin Leiber - 1998 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (4):579-580.
Atran’s Unnatural Kinds.David Davies - 2005 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 5 (2):345-357.
Folk Biology and External Definitions.James A. Hampton - 1998 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (4):574-574.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
14 ( #653,174 of 2,340,319 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #514,582 of 2,340,319 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes