Sleeping Beauty and direct inference

Analysis 71 (2):290-293 (2011)
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One argument for the thirder position on the Sleeping Beauty problem rests on direct inference from objective probabilities. In this paper, I consider a particularly clear version of this argument by John Pollock and his colleagues (The Oscar Seminar 2008). I argue that such a direct inference is defeated by the fact that Beauty has an equally good reason to conclude on the basis of direct inference that the probability of heads is 1/2. Hence, neither thirders nor halfers can find direct support in an appeal to objective probabilities.



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Joel Pust
University of Delaware

References found in this work

The structure of objects.Kathrin Koslicki - 2008 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The theory of probability.Hans Reichenbach - 1949 - Berkeley,: University of California Press.
Nomic Probability and the Foundations of Induction.John L. Pollock - 1990 - New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.

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