Utilitarianism in Infinite Worlds

Utilitas 12 (1):91 (2000)

Authors
Joel David Hamkins
Oxford University
Abstract
Recently in the philosophical literature there has been some effort made to understand the proper application of the theory of utilitarianism to worlds in which there are infinitely many bearers of utility. Here, we point out that one of the best, most inclusive principles proposed to date contradicts fundamental utilitarian ideas, such as the idea that adding more utility makes a better world
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DOI 10.1017/s0953820800002648
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