When is a fallacy not a fallacy?

Metaphilosophy 19 (3‐4):307-312 (1988)
The informal fallacies can be conceived as enthymemes that are formally valid. But, then, what accounts for our sense of their fallaciousness? I explain this in terms of the notion of a warrant.
Keywords informal fallacy  warrant  enthymeme
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9973.1988.tb00776.x
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