A Case of affirming the consequent in international law: un security council resolution 232 (1966)—southern rhodesia

History and Philosophy of Logic 15 (2):201-210 (1994)
In this note I examine a case of teleological reasoning in international law and find it to be the fallacy of affirming the consequent.I then show that and how the basis of this fallacy is a manipulation (or juxtaposition) of ?necessary? and ?sufficient? conditions.I conclude by giving reasons for thinking that this kind of reasoning is a regular feature of international law
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DOI 10.1080/01445349408837232
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References found in this work BETA
Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory.Neil MacCormick - 1978 - Oxford University Press.
Wittgenstein Versus Hart Two Models of Rules for Social and Legal Theory.John Hund - 1991 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 21 (1):72-85.
Insiders and Outsiders Models of Deviance and Jurisprudence.John Hund - 1985 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 15 (1):35-44.

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H.L.A. Hart's Contribution to Legal Anthropology.John Hund - 1996 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 26 (3):275–292.

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