A Case of affirming the consequent in international law: un security council resolution 232 (1966)—southern rhodesia

History and Philosophy of Logic 15 (2):201-210 (1994)
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Abstract

In this note I examine a case of teleological reasoning in international law and find it to be the fallacy of affirming the consequent.I then show that and how the basis of this fallacy is a manipulation (or juxtaposition) of ?necessary? and ?sufficient? conditions.I conclude by giving reasons for thinking that this kind of reasoning is a regular feature of international law

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Citations of this work

H.l.A. Hart's contribution to legal anthropology.John Hund - 1996 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 26 (3):275–292.

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References found in this work

Legal reasoning and legal theory.Neil MacCormick (ed.) - 1978 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Wittgenstein versus Hart two models of rules for social and legal theory.John Hund - 1991 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 21 (1):72-85.
Insiders and outsiders models of deviance and jurisprudence.John Hund - 1985 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 15 (1):35-44.

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