An epistemic theory of objective chance
A theory of objective, single-case chances is presented and defended. The theory states that the chance of an event E is its epistemic probability, given maximal knowledge of the possible causes of E. This theory is uniquely successful in entailing all the known properties of chance, but involves heavy metaphysical commitment. It requires an objective rationality that determines proper degrees of belief in some contexts.
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