Philosophia 45 (2):717-734 (2017)

Authors
Jennifer Nado
University of Hong Kong
Abstract
In previous work we proposed a sketch of a disposition-based metasemantictheory, which has recently been criticized by James Andow. Andow claims, first, that our dispositionalmetasemantics threatens to render the meanings of our words indeterminate, and second, that our viewrisks a 'semantic apocalypse' according to which most of our terms fail to refer. We respond to Andow'scriticism by modifying and expanding our orignial, underspecified view. In particular, we propose that a viewthat appeals to actual dispositions rather than counterfactual dispositions avoids many difficulties that might confront a disposition-based metasemantics - issues even beyond those that Andow raises.
Keywords Metasemantics   Dispositions   Philosophy of language
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DOI 10.1007/s11406-017-9840-1
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