Utilitas 22 (3):285-302 (2010)

Authors
Jens Johansson
Uppsala University
Abstract
In this article I discuss the question of whether a person’s existence can be better (or worse) for him than his non-existence. Recently, Nils Holtug and Melinda A. Roberts have defended an affirmative answer. These defenses, I shall argue, do not succeed. In different ways, Holtug and Roberts have got the metaphysics and axiology wrong. However, I also argue that a person’s existence can after all be better (or worse) for him than his non-existence, though for reasons other than those provided by Holtug and Roberts.
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DOI 10.1017/s0953820810000208
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References found in this work BETA

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.
Some Puzzles About the Evil of Death.Fred Feldman - 1991 - Philosophical Review 100 (2):205-227.
The Benefits of Coming Into Existence.Krister Bykvist - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 135 (3):335-362.
Basic Intrinsic Value.Fred Feldman - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 99 (3):319-346.

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Citations of this work BETA

Intrinsic Vs. Extrinsic Value.Michael J. Zimmerman - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Comparative Harm, Creation and Death.Neil Feit - 2016 - Utilitas 28 (2):136-163.
The Value of Existence.Wlodek Rabinowicz & Gustaf Arrhenius - 2015 - In Iwao Hirose & Jonas Olson (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory. Oxford University Press USA. pp. 424-444.
The Asymmetry: A Solution.Melinda A. Roberts - 2011 - Theoria 77 (4):333-367.
An Asymmetry in the Ethics of Procreation.Melinda A. Roberts - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (11):765-776.

View all 20 citations / Add more citations

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