Boole and mill: differing perspectives on logical psychologism

History and Philosophy of Logic 1 (1-2):19-36 (1980)
Logical psychologism is the position that logic is a special branch of psychology, that logical laws are descriptíons of experience to be arrived at through observation, and are a posteriori.The accepted arguments against logical psychologism are effective only when directed against this extreme version. However, the clauses in the above characterization are independent and ambiguous, and may be considered separately. This separation permits a reconsideration of less extreme attempts to tie logic to psychology, such as those defended by Mill and Boole. It also provides the basis for a reexamination of the relationship between logic and psychology, and raises the possibility of a deeper investigation into the nature of logic itself
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/01445348008837003
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 31,786
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Thought.Gilbert Harman - 1973 - Princeton University Press.
On the Relation Between Logic and Thinking.Mary Henle - 1962 - Psychological Review 69 (4):366-378.

View all 20 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Projective Geometry and Mathematical Progress in Mid-Victorian Britain.Joan L. Richards - 1986 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 17 (3):297-325.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Added to PP index

Total downloads
23 ( #248,870 of 2,231,532 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #445,507 of 2,231,532 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature