Erkenntnis 64 (2):139 - 168 (2006)

Authors
Kent Johnson
University of California, Irvine
Wayne Wright
California State University, Long Beach
Abstract
We examine the pros and cons of color realism, exposing some desiderata on a theory of color: the theory should render colors as scientifically legitimate and correctly individuated, and it should explain how we have veridical color experiences. We then show that these desiderata can by met by treating colors as properties of the special sciences. According to our view, some of the major as properties of the special sciences. According to our view, some of the major disputes in the literature about color -- anti-realism versus dispositionalism versus reductionism -- are not well-founded at this stage of scientific inquiry. Our account of color is designed to be of use in the sciences and as such is driven largely by considerations of what the various sciences need in order to proceed appropriately. We argue that a scientific theory of colors need not regard colors as anything more than high-level statistical constructs built out of correlations between color experiences and other phenomena
Keywords Color  Irreducibility  Phenomena  Properties  Realism  Science
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Reprint years 2006
DOI 10.1007/s10670-005-4310-8
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References found in this work BETA

The Language of Thought.Jerry A. Fodor - 1975 - Harvard University Press.
Consciousness, Color, and Content.Michael Tye - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 113 (3):233-235.
The Language of Thought.J. A. Fodor - 1978 - Critica 10 (28):140-143.
Naturalizing the Mind.Fred Dretske - 1995 - Philosophy 72 (279):150-154.

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Citations of this work BETA

Explanation and the Hard Problem.Wayne Wright - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 132 (2):301-330.
Perception, Color, and Realism.Wayne Wright - 2010 - Erkenntnis 73 (1):19 - 40.
Why Naturalize Consciousness?Wayne Wright - 2007 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (4):583-607.

View all 9 citations / Add more citations

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