Philosophy and Social Criticism 27 (1):39-62 (2001)

The paper reviews the extent to which main formulations in Habermas's recent major work, Between Facts and Norms, make ground against feminist objections to the Habermasian project. Although the later work does not tamper with the core project of Habermas's theory of modernity, the terms in which the procedural norms of democratic interaction are now conceived clarify the sympathetic relevance of Habermas's project to feminism's own vital concerns. There is reason to suppose Habermas's construction of the motivations that prompt and guide struggles to achieve personal autonomy is rather too narrowly conceived to capture the range of impulses that inform contemporary feminism. Despite this, I suggest that there remain good reasons for supposing that the recent conception of the project opens up the possibility for a more positive stage in Habermas's dialogue with feminism. Key Words: aesthetic communication • feminism • Habermas • private/public relations • public sphere.
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DOI 10.1177/019145370102700103
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The Public and its problems.John Dewey - 1927 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 13 (3):367-368.
The Generalised and the Concrete Other.Seyla Benhabib - 1987 - In Eva Feder Kittay & Diana T. Meyers (eds.), Women and Moral Theory. Rowman & Littlefield.

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