History and Philosophy of Logic 5 (2):177-194 (1984)
Dummett's case against platonism rests on arguments concerning the acquisition and manifestation of knowledge of meaning. Dummett's arguments are here criticized from a viewpoint less Davidsonian than Chomskian. Dummett's case against formalism is obscure because in its prescriptive considerations are not clearly separated from descriptive. Dummett's implicit value judgments are here made explicit and questioned. ?Combat Revisionism!? Chairman Mao
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References found in this work BETA
The Semantic Conception of Truth: And the Foundations of Semantics.Alfred Tarski - 1943 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4 (3):341-376.
Conceptual Role Semantics.Mark Greenberg & Gilbert Harman - 2007 - In Ernest LePore & Barry Smith (eds.), Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic. Oxford University Press. pp. 242-256.
Citations of this work BETA
Constructive Mathematics and Quantum Mechanics: Unbounded Operators and the Spectral Theorem. [REVIEW]Geoffrey Hellman - 1993 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 22 (3):221 - 248.
Are Dummett's Requirements on a Theory of Meaning Sufficient for Rejecting Classical Logic?Cesare Cozzo - 1994 - Erkenntnis 40 (2):243 - 263.
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