Francescotti on fission

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (4):476-481 (2009)
Abstract
Most versions of the psychological-continuity approach to personal identity (PCA) contain a 'non-branching' requirement. Recently, Robert Francescotti has argued that while such versions of PCA handle Parfit's standard fission case well, they deliver the wrong result in the case of an intact human brain. To solve this problem, he says, PCA-adherents need to add a clause that runs contrary to the spirit of their theory. In this response, I argue that Francescotti's counterexample fails. As a result, the revision he suggests is not needed.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2009.01350.x
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 25,662
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
Minds, Brains and Programs.John R. Searle - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):417-57.
Survival and Identity.David Lewis - 1976 - In Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons. University of California Press. pp. 17-40.
Temporal Parts of Four Dimensional Objects.Mark Heller - 1984 - Philosophical Studies 46 (3):323 - 334.

View all 9 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Psychological Continuity and the Necessity of Identity.Robert Francescotti - 2010 - American Philosophical Quarterly 47 (4):337-350.
Three Forms of Psychological Discontinuity.Desheng Zong - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 18:103-127.
Fission, Fusion, and the Parfit Revolution.Douglas E. Ehring - 1999 - Philosophical Studies 94 (3):329-32.
The Closest Continuer View Revisited.Marc Slors - 2004 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (3):387-402.

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-11-12

Total downloads

43 ( #115,389 of 2,143,766 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

1 ( #386,855 of 2,143,766 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums