Philosophical Studies 177 (6):1539-1548 (2020)

Authors
Jens Johansson
Uppsala University
Olle Risberg
Uppsala University
Abstract
A prominent objection to the counterfactual comparative account of harm is that it classifies as harmful some events that are, intuitively, mere failures to benefit. In an attempt to solve this problem, Duncan Purves has recently proposed a novel version of the counterfactual comparative account, which relies on a distinction between making upshots happen and allowing upshots to happen. In this response, we argue that Purves’s account is unsuccessful. It fails in cases where an action makes the subject occupy a high well-being level though one of the available alternatives would have made it even higher. In fact, it fails even in some cases where each of the available alternatives to the action that was actually performed would have made the subject’s well-being level lower.
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-019-01273-5
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References found in this work BETA

Doing and Allowing Harm.Fiona Woollard - 2015 - Oxford University Press.
Doing Away with Harm.Ben Bradley - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):390-412.
Harm: Omission, Preemption, Freedom.Nathan Hanna - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (2):251-73.
Plural Harm.Neil Feit - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (2):361-388.
Harming as Making Worse Off.Duncan Purves - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (10):2629-2656.

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Citations of this work BETA

Causal Accounts of Harming.Erik Carlson, Jens Johansson & Olle Risberg - forthcoming - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.

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