Moderate Intuitionism


Authors
Jennifer Nado
University of Hong Kong
Abstract
Recent empirical work suggests that intuitions may be less reliable than previously assumed. However, given the ubiquity of intuition in philosophical reasoning, it is tempting to give intuitions some evidential weight. This chapter develops an account called ‘moderate intuitionism’, a view whereby intuitions are generally reliable, but nonetheless capable of substantial degrees of error. Believing that the general reliability of intuition emerges from the nature of language, the chapter develops an outline for a disposition-based metasemantic theory which can ground the link between intuition and truth: terms refer to whatever a speaker would be disposed to apply them to when in possession of all relevant information. Well-constructed thought experiments can elicit intuitions and generally reflect the semantic facts but this account can also explain why intuitions occasionally err — i.e. when a thought experiment fails to specify information that would influence the speaker’s dispositions.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 65,579
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Intuitions.James Andow - 2016 - Analysis 76 (2):232-246.
The Intuitive Basis for Contextualism.Geoff Pynn - 2017 - In Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism. Routledge. pp. 32--43.
On Complete Information Dispositionalism.Mons Nyquist - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (5):1915-1938.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Moderate Intuitionism and the Epistemology of Moral Judgment.Robert Audi - 1998 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 1 (1):15-44.
Moral Intuitionism and Disagreement.Brian Besong - 2014 - Synthese 191 (12):2767-2789.
Intuitionism.David Kaspar - 2012 - Continuum.
Renewing Moral Intuitionism.Elizabeth Tropman - 2009 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 6 (4):440-463.
(Metasemantically) Securing Free Will.Jason Turner - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):295-310.
Moral Intuitionism and the Challenges of Mysteriousness and Dogmatism.Mark D. Mathewson - 2003 - Dissertation, The University of Nebraska - Lincoln
The Metasyntactic Interpretation of Two-Dimensionalism.Gregory Bochner - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (3):611-626.
The Prudent Conscience View.Brian Besong - 2014 - International Philosophical Quarterly 54 (2):127-141.
Moderate Partisanship as Oscillation.Stephen Mumford - 2012 - Sport, Ethics and Philosophy 6 (3):369-375.
Non-Inferential Moral Knowledge.Elizabeth Tropman - 2011 - Acta Analytica 26 (4):355-366.
Intuitionism.Anthony Skelton - 2013 - In James Crimmins (ed.), Bloomsbury Encyclopedia of Utilitarianism. Bloomsbury Academic.
Intuitionism and Subjectivism.Mark T. Nelson - 1991 - Metaphilosophy 22 (1-2):115-121.
Intuitionism and Conservatism.Mark T. Nelson - 1990 - Metaphilosophy 21 (3):282-293.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2016-02-06

Total views
20 ( #544,247 of 2,461,988 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #448,803 of 2,461,988 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes