Theoria 76 (3):221-248 (2010)

John N. Williams
Singapore Management University
In this journal, Hamid Vahid argues against three families of explanation of Moore-paradoxicality. The first is the Wittgensteinian approach; I assert that p just in case I assert that I believe that p. So making a Moore-paradoxical assertion involves contradictory assertions. The second is the epistemic approach, one committed to: if I am justified in believing that p then I am justified in believing that I believe that p. So it is impossible to have a justified omissive Moore-paradoxical belief. The third is the conscious belief approach, being committed to: if I consciously believe that p then I believe that I believe that p. So if I have a conscious omissive Moore-paradoxical belief, then I have contradictory second-order beliefs. In their place, Vahid argues for the defective-interpretation approach, broadly that charity requires us to discount the utterer of a Moore-paradoxical sentence as a speaker. I agree that the Wittgensteinian approach is unsatisfactory. But so is the defective-interpretation approach. However, there is a satisfactory version of each of the epistemic and conscious-belief approaches
Keywords paradox  assertion  consciousness  speech‐acts  justification  belief  Moore  irrationality
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DOI 10.1111/j.1755-2567.2010.01073.x
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References found in this work BETA

Blindspots.Roy A. Sorensen - 1988 - Oxford University Press.
Objects of Thought.A. N. PRIOR - 1971 - Clarendon Press.

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Moore's Paradox in Thought: A Critical Survey.John N. Williams - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (1):24-37.
Assertion and Its Many Norms.John N. Williams - 2017 - Manuscrito 40 (4):39-76.

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