Non-reductionism and special concern

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (4):641 – 657 (2007)
Abstract
The so-called 'Extreme Claim' asserts that reductionism about personal identity leaves each of us with no reason to be specially concerned about his or her own future. Both advocates and opponents of the Extreme Claim, whether of a reductionist or non-reductionist stripe, accept that similar problems do not arise for non-reductionism. In this paper I challenge this widely held assumption.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/00048400701654804
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 25,651
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
The Methods of Ethics.Henry Sidgwick - 1874 - Thoemmes Press.

View all 22 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Parfit on Fission.Jens Johansson - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 2010 (150):21 - 35.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

73 ( #68,328 of 2,143,548 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

5 ( #163,096 of 2,143,548 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums