Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (4):641 – 657 (2007)
The so-called 'Extreme Claim' asserts that reductionism about personal identity leaves each of us with no reason to be specially concerned about his or her own future. Both advocates and opponents of the Extreme Claim, whether of a reductionist or non-reductionist stripe, accept that similar problems do not arise for non-reductionism. In this paper I challenge this widely held assumption.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Four Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time.Theodore Sider - 2001 - Oxford University Press.
The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology.Eric T. Olson - 1997 - Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Similar books and articles
Indefensible Middle Ground for Local Reductionism About Testimony.Axel Gelfert - 2009 - Ratio 22 (2):170-190.
Two Cheers for Reductionism, or, the Dim Prospects for Nonreductive Materialism.Andrew Melnyk - 1995 - Philosophy of Science 62 (3):370-88.
Reductionism About Persons; and What Matters.Timothy Chappell - 1998 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 98 (1):41-58.
The Irrelevance/Incoherence of Non-Reductionism About Personal Identity.David W. Shoemaker - 2002 - Philo 5 (2):143-160.
Grene on Mechanism and Reductionism: More Than Just a Side Issue.Robert N. Brandon - 1984 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1984:345 - 353.
Darwinian Reductionism, or, How to Stop Worrying and Love Molecular Biology.Alexander Rosenberg - 2006 - University of Chicago Press.
The Metaphysics of Personal Identity and Our Special Concern for the Future.Amy Kind - 2004 - Metaphilosophy 35 (4):536-553.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads73 ( #68,328 of 2,143,548 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #163,096 of 2,143,548 )
How can I increase my downloads?
There are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.