Naive Moral Fictionalism

Abstract

As a descriptive theory, moral fictionalism proposes that moral claims are typically based on the fundamental error of attributing moral values with an objective, independent status that they cannot possess. This illusory belief in the reality of moral values has been aptly described as naïve moral realism. Yet, the assumed prevalence of moral realism, however naïve, is a crucial question that has not been adequately defended by proponents of moral fictionalism and is found to be inconsistent with much empirical research in moral psychology that reveals a much more sophisticated understanding of the meanings of moral beliefs and judgements. In addition to these empirical weaknesses, moral fictionalism tends to rely on a naïve interpretation of: (1) the conceptual validity and scope of the cognitivivist/non-cognitivist distinction (2) the categoricity of moral judgements (3) the descriptive language of moral discourse These serious flaws provide good reason for describing the theory itself as naïve moral fictionalism.

Links

PhilArchive

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

  • Only published works are available at libraries.

Similar books and articles

The Return of Moral Fictionalism.Nadeem J. Z. Hussain - 2004 - Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):149–188.
Moral fictionalism versus the rest.Daniel Nolan, Greg Restall & Caroline West - 2005 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (3):307 – 330.
A dilemma for moral fictionalism.Matthew Chrisman - 2007 - Philosophical Books 49 (1):4-13.
An Amoral Manifesto Part I.Joel Marks - 2010 - Philosophy Now (80):30-33.
An Amoral Manifesto Part II.Joel Marks - 2010 - Philosophy Now (81):23-26.
Morality is not good.Samuel Green - 2011 - Emergent Australasian Philosophers 4 (1).
Projection and Pretence in Ethics.Edmund Dain - 2012 - Philosophical Papers 41 (2):181 - 208.
Moral Fictionalism.Richard Joyce - 2005 - In Mark Eli Kalderon (ed.), Fictionalism in Metaphysics. Oxford University Press. pp. 287-313.

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-11-18

Downloads
36 (#403,339)

6 months
2 (#889,309)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Thomas Johnson
City College of New York

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references