Past and Future Non-Existence

The Journal of Ethics 17 (1-2):51-64 (2013)
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Abstract

According to the “deprivation approach,” a person’s death is bad for her to the extent that it deprives her of goods. This approach faces the Lucretian problem that prenatal non-existence deprives us of goods just as much as death does, but does not seem bad at all. The two most prominent responses to this challenge—one of which is provided by Frederik Kaufman (inspired by Thomas Nagel) and the other by Anthony Brueckner and John Martin Fischer—claim that prenatal non-existence is relevantly different from death. This paper criticizes these responses

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Jens Johansson
Uppsala University

References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
Well-Being and Death.Ben Bradley - 2009 - Oxford University Press.
Death.Thomas Nagel - 1970 - Noûs 4 (1):73-80.

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