Probabilistic conditionals are almost monotonic
Review of Symbolic Logic 1 (1):73-80 (2008)
Abstract
One interpretation of the conditional If P then Q is as saying that the probability of Q given P is high. This is an interpretation suggested by Adams (1966) and pursued more recently by Edgington (1995). Of course, this probabilistic conditional is nonmonotonic, that is, if the probability of Q given P is high, and R implies P, it need not follow that the probability of Q given R is high. If we were confident of concluding Q from the fact that we knew P, and we have stronger information R, we can no longer be confident of Q. We show nonetheless that usually we would still be justified in concluding Q from R. In other words, probabilistic conditionals are mostly monotonicAuthor Profiles
DOI
10.1017/s1755020308080106
My notes
Similar books and articles
Context Probabilism.Seth Yalcin - 2012 - In M. Aloni, Maria Aloni, Vadim Kimmelmann, Floris Roelofson, Galit W. Sassoon, Katrin Schulz & Matthijs Westera (eds.), Logic, Language, and Meaning: 18th Amsterdam Colloquium, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, December 19-21, 2011, Revised Selected Papers. Berlin: Springer. pp. 12-21.
A Semantic Approach to Non-Monotonic Conditionals.James Hawthorne - 1988 - In J. F. Lemmer & L. N. Kanal (eds.), Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence 2. Elsevier.
On the logic of nonmonotonic conditionals and conditional probabilities.James Hawthorne - 1996 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 25 (2):185-218.
On the logic of nonmonotonic conditionals and conditional probabilities: Predicate logic. [REVIEW]James Hawthorne - 1998 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 27 (1):1-34.
Probabilistic theories of reasoning need pragmatics too: Modulating relevance in uncertain conditionals.A. J. B. Fugard, Niki Pfeifer & B. Mayerhofer - 2011 - Journal of Pragmatics 43:2034–2042.
Uncertain deductive reasoning.Niki Pfeifer & G. D. Kleiter - 2011 - In K. Manktelow, D. E. Over & S. Elqayam (eds.), The Science of Reason: A Festschrift for Jonathan St B.T. Evans. Psychology Press. pp. 145--166.
Adams conditionals and non-monotonic probabilities.Richard Bradley - 2006 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 15 (1-2):65-81.
Analytics
Added to PP
2009-01-28
Downloads
48 (#246,608)
6 months
1 (#455,463)
2009-01-28
Downloads
48 (#246,608)
6 months
1 (#455,463)
Historical graph of downloads
Author Profiles
Citations of this work
Reward versus risk in uncertain inference: Theorems and simulations.Gerhard Schurz & Paul D. Thorn - 2012 - Review of Symbolic Logic 5 (4):574-612.
Logical questions behind the lottery and preface paradoxes: lossy rules for uncertain inference.David Makinson - 2012 - Synthese 186 (2):511-529.
References found in this work
Truth and probability.Frank Ramsey - 1926 - In Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. Routledge. pp. 52-94.
The Logic of Conditionals: An Application of Probability to Deductive Logic.Ernest Wilcox Adams - 1996 - Dordrecht, Netherland: D. Reidel Pub. Co..
Probabilities of conditionals and conditional probabilities.David Lewis - 1976 - Philosophical Review 85 (3):297-315.