Précis of Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness [Book Review]

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):172 - 181 (2004)
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Abstract

In Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness I argue that the Zombie Argument, the Knowledge Argument, and the Modal Argument do not provide people with broadly common-sensical views about consciousness and the mental, and an inclination towards physicalism, any reasons not to be physicalists. That is, they do not support the doctrine of neo-dualism, advocated by Chalmers, Jackson, and others: although the mind may be the brain, qualia, the what-its-like properties of experiences that makes them experiences, are not physical properties.

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John Perry
University of California, Riverside

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