Abstract
This paper defends a model of the internalism requirement against Michael Smith’s recent criticisms of it. On this “example model”, what we have reason to do is what we would be motivated to do were we rational. After criticizing the example model, Smith argues that his “advice model”, that what we have reason to do is what we would advise ourselves to do were we rational, is obviously preferable. The author argues that Smith’s criticisms can quite easily be accommodated by the example model. Moreover, to the extent that his model connects reasons to advice, it is not a model of the internalism requirement at all. Yet, to the extent that it connects reasons to motivation, his model collapses into the example model. The author ends by arguing that Smith’s view simply proposes an unambitious conception of practical rationality, not an alternative construal of the internalism requirement.
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  Philosophy of Mind
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ISBN(s) 0031-8205
DOI ppr199757356
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Citations of this work BETA

Authoritatively Normative Concepts.Tristram McPherson - forthcoming - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford University Press.
Reasons for Action: Internal Vs. External.Stephen Finlay & Mark Schroeder - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Varieties of Reasons/Motives Internalism.Steven Arkonovich - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (3):210-219.
Sound Advice and Internal Reasons.Ariela Tubert - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2):181-199.

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