Reasoning about intentionality in preverbal infants

In Peter Carruthers (ed.), The Innate Mind: Structure and Contents. New York: Oxford University Press New York. pp. 254--271 (2005)

Abstract
Researchers disagree over whether preverbal infants have any true understanding of other minds. There seem to be at least two sources of hesitation among researchers. Some doubt that infants have any concepts as sophisticated as that implied by the term ‘intentionality’. Other researchers simply doubt that infants understand anything in a conceptual way. This chapter provides arguments in favour of infants' abilities in both respects. It describes data from one study in which the method itself was designed to assess conceptual representations abstracted away from perception-action systems.
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Reprint years 2007
DOI 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195179675.003.0015
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