Ratio 22 (2):206-215 (2009)
It is usually taken for granted that the necessary and sufficient conditions for refraining are with respect to mental or behavioral states of agents. Let us call such accounts internalist conceptions of refraining. In this paper, I argue that internalist conditions are insufficient for refraining; and so internalist conceptions of refraining are inadequate. I conclude that a proper account of refraining must contain an externalist condition – i.e., a condition that makes reference to an agent's environment.
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