Should Social Preferences Be Consistent?

Economics and Philosophy 5 (1):7 (1989)
Should social preferences conform to the principles of rationality we normally expect of individuals? Should they, for instance, conform to the consistency axioms of expected utility theory? This article considers one fragment of this question
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DOI 10.1017/S0266267100002236
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References found in this work BETA
The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1954 - Wiley Publications in Statistics.
Liberty and Social Choice.Amartya Sen - 1983 - Journal of Philosophy 80 (1):5-28.
Utilitarianism and Expected Utility.John Broome - 1987 - Journal of Philosophy 84 (8):405-422.
Utilitarianism, Uncertainty and Information.Peter J. Hammond - 1982 - In Amartya Kumar Sen & Bernard Arthur Owen Williams (eds.), Utilitarianism and Beyond. Cambridge University Press. pp. 85--102.

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Citations of this work BETA
The Common Prior Assumption in Economic Theory.Stephen Morris - 1995 - Economics and Philosophy 11 (2):227.
The Scope and Limits of Preference Sovereignty.Tyler Cowen - 1993 - Economics and Philosophy 9 (2):253.

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