Argumentation 1 (3):239-253 (1987)

Criticisms of fallacy theory have been lodged from many different directions. In this paper, I consider the classic criticism of incompleteness by DeMorgan, Finocchiaro's claim that fallacies probably exist only in the mind of the interpreter, McPeck's claim that fallacies are at best context-dependent and Paul's complaints about the teaching of fallacies. I seek not merely to defend fallacy theory against unfair criticisms but also to learn from the criticisms what can be done in order to make fallacy theory a viable theory of criticism. I argue that this will involve several changes: rethinking of the nature of fallacy; addressing some theoretical issues; and presenting fallacy theory in a more rigorous fashion. The paper concludes with reflections on how Quine's ontological advice about the resolution of ontological disputes might be applied to the issue of whether or not there are fallacies
Keywords fallacy  fallacy theory  logic  informal logic  argumentation  reasoning  inference
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DOI 10.1007/BF00136776
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The Fixation of Belief.C. S. Peirce - 1877 - Popular Science Monthly 12 (1):1--15.
Fallacies and the Evaluation of Reasoning.Maurice A. Finocchiaro - 1981 - American Philosophical Quarterly 18 (1):13 - 22.

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Reductionism in Fallacy Theory.Christoph Lumer - 2000 - Argumentation 14 (4):405-423.

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