The concept of practice in Wittgenstein's later philosophy

Abstract
It is argued in this article that the concept of practice is one of the key concepts in Wittgenstein's later philosophy. It partly replaces his earlier talk about the inexpressible. ?The practice has to speak for itself, as Wittgenstein succinctly puts it. The concept of practice not only points to the ways in which the unity of our concepts are underpinned, as Gordon Baker has it, it also comprises the skills involved in handling the conceptualized phenomena, our prereflective familiarity with them, expressed in the sureness in our behaviour towards them, and the judgmental power exercised in applying or withholding a given concept on a particular occasion. These factors are all relevant to the establishment of knowledge, but they cannot themselves be fully and straightforwardly articulated by verbal means. Nevertheless, they represent what we go by when we apply concepts and other types of rules. To follow a rule is what Wittgenstein calls a practice. The sketched analysis of this concept makes us understand better how it is possible to apply a rule without the support of another rule. It also makes us realize in what sense one is justified in talking about tacit knowledge in connection with the application of concepts and rule?following in general. Quite a lot hangs on seeing the world aright at this point
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/00201748808602161
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 28,840
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Philosophical Papers.G. E. Moore - 1959 - New York: Macmillan.
Zettel.G. E. M. Anscombe & G. H. von Wright (eds.) - 2007 - University of California Press.

View all 9 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
The Expansion of Epistemology: The Metaphysical Vs. The Practical Approach.Zhenhua Yu - 2012 - Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 11 (1):83-100.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-30

Total downloads

65 ( #81,797 of 2,178,269 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

2 ( #166,094 of 2,178,269 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums