Authors
Joshua Johnson
Saint Louis University
Abstract
I argue that if Wittgenstein’s Private Language Argument is correct, then both Theory Theory and Simulation Theory are inadequate accounts of how we come to know other minds since both theories assume the reality of a private language. Further, following the work of a number of philosophers and psychologists, I defend a ‘Second-Person Approach’ to mindreading according to which it is possible for us to be directly aware of at least some of the mental states of others. Because it is not necessary to assume a private language within the Second-Person Approach, I argue that this account of social cognition is superior to Theory-Theory and Simulation Theory since it avoids the objections of the PLA.
Keywords Theory of Mind  Wittgenstein  Second Person
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DOI 10.24204/ejpr.v5i4.206
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References found in this work BETA

The Practice of Mind: Theory, Simulation or Primary Interaction?Shaun Gallagher - 2001 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (5-7):83-108.
What Mary Didn’T Know.Frank Jackson - 1986 - Journal of Philosophy 83 (5):291-295.
Simulation Trouble.Shaun Gallagher - 2007 - Social Neuroscience 2 (3-4):353–365.

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