Philosophical Studies 83 (1):93 - 112 (1996)

Abstract
In his 1987 book _Conditionals, Frank Jackson presents an argument to the effect that the indicative conditionals of natural language have the same truth conditions as the material conditional of truth-functional logic. This Jackson refers to as the "paradox of indicative conditionals." I offer a solution to this paradox by arguing that some conditionals that appear to be in the indicative mood are actually subjunctives, to which the paradox does not apply. I support this proposed solution with some historical observations on the evolution of the English verb phrase. (edited)
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DOI 10.1007/BF00372436
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Philosophical Papers.J. L. Austin - 1961 - Oxford University Press.
Conditionals.Frank Jackson (ed.) - 1991 - Oxford University Press.
Conditionals.Frank Jackson - 1992 - Philosophical Quarterly 42 (167):266.

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