The paradox of indicative conditionals

Philosophical Studies 83 (1):93 - 112 (1996)
Abstract
In his 1987 book _Conditionals, Frank Jackson presents an argument to the effect that the indicative conditionals of natural language have the same truth conditions as the material conditional of truth-functional logic. This Jackson refers to as the "paradox of indicative conditionals." I offer a solution to this paradox by arguing that some conditionals that appear to be in the indicative mood are actually subjunctives, to which the paradox does not apply. I support this proposed solution with some historical observations on the evolution of the English verb phrase. (edited)
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/BF00372436
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 61,089
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Philosophical Papers.J. L. Austin - 1961 - Oxford University Press.
Conditionals.Frank Jackson (ed.) - 1991 - Oxford University Press.
Conditionals.Frank Jackson - 1992 - Philosophical Quarterly 42 (167):266.

View all 6 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Do Indicative Conditionals Express Propositions?Daniel Rothschild - 2013 - Noûs 47 (1):49-68.
Indicative and Subjunctive Conditionals.Brian Weatherson - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 51 (203):200-216.
Subjunctive Biscuit and Stand-Off Conditionals.Eric Swanson - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (3):637-648.
Wondering What Might Be.Moritz Schulz - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (3):367 - 386.
Defending a Possible-Worlds Account of Indicative Conditionals.Daniel Nolan - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 116 (3):215-269.
DeRose on the Conditionals of Deliberation.Daniel Dohrn - manuscript
On Truth-Conditions for If (but Not Quite Only If ).Anthony S. Gillies - 2009 - Philosophical Review 118 (3):325-349.
Some Remarks on Indicative Conditionals.Barbara Abbott - unknown

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
54 ( #192,725 of 2,440,151 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #432,124 of 2,440,151 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes



Home | New books and articles | Bibliographies | Philosophy journals | Discussions | Article Index | About PhilPapers | API | Contact us | Code of conduct

CDP Phiosophy Documentation Center
PhilPapers logo by Andrea Andrews and Meghan Driscoll.
This site uses cookies and Google Analytics (see our terms & conditions for details regarding the privacy implications).

Use of this site is subject to terms & conditions.
All rights reserved by The PhilPapers Foundation

Page generated Thu Aug 5 05:04:50 2021 on philpapers-web-65948fd446-wp78j
Debug information

cache stats: hit=22405, miss=17680, save=
autohandler : 314 ms
called component : 296 ms
entry : 296 ms
entry_basics : 118 ms
entry-header : 96 ms
menu : 93 ms
citations-references : 57 ms
similar_entries : 36 ms
citations-citations : 29 ms
entry_stats : 22 ms
entry-cats : 17 ms
entry-links : 8 ms
entry-side : 8 ms
save cache object : 6 ms
prepCit : 5 ms
get_entry : 2 ms
entry_chapters : 2 ms
entry_stats_query : 1 ms
retrieve cache object : 1 ms
init renderer : 0 ms
setup : 0 ms
auth : 0 ms
writeLog : 0 ms
stat_db : 0 ms
entry-buttons : 0 ms


pid: 399981