The Time of Death's Badness

Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 37 (5):464-479 (2012)
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Those who endorse the view that death is in some cases bad for the deceased—a view that, as I shall explain, has considerable bearing on many bioethical issues—need to address the following, Epicurean question: When is death bad for the one who dies? The two most popular answers are "before death" (priorism) and "after death" (subsequentism). Part of the support for these two views consists in the idea that a third answer, "at no time" (atemporalism), makes death unsatisfyingly different from other evils. I argue that this objection is mistaken, and that priorism and subsequentism face problems that atemporalism avoids. Moreover, I argue that if it is nonetheless insisted that we must find a time at which my death is bad for me, we can appeal to periods that begin before my death and end after my death. I end with some implications for posthumous harm



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Jens Johansson
Uppsala University

Citations of this work

Dissolving Death’s Time-of-Harm Problem.Travis Timmerman - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (2):405-418.
Desire satisfaction, death, and time.Duncan Purves - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (6):799-819.
Responding to the Timing Argument.Karl Ekendahl - 2021 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 103 (4):753-771.
Døden som et onde.Carl Tollef Solberg - 2019 - Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift 54 (3):167-186.

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Why abortion is immoral.Don Marquis - 1989 - Journal of Philosophy 86 (4):183-202.

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