Un-making artificial moral agents

Ethics and Information Technology 10 (2-3):123-133 (2008)
Abstract
Floridi and Sanders, seminal work, “On the morality of artificial agents” has catalyzed attention around the moral status of computer systems that perform tasks for humans, effectively acting as “artificial agents.” Floridi and Sanders argue that the class of entities considered moral agents can be expanded to include computers if we adopt the appropriate level of abstraction. In this paper we argue that the move to distinguish levels of abstraction is far from decisive on this issue. We also argue that adopting certain levels of abstraction out of context can be dangerous when the level of abstraction obscures the humans who constitute computer systems. We arrive at this critique of Floridi and Sanders by examining the debate over the moral status of computer systems using the notion of interpretive flexibility. We frame the debate as a struggle over the meaning and significance of computer systems that behave independently, and not as a debate about the ‘true’ status of autonomous systems. Our analysis leads to the conclusion that while levels of abstraction are useful for particular purposes, when it comes to agency and responsibility, computer systems should be conceptualized and identified in ways that keep them tethered to the humans who create and deploy them.
Keywords artificial moral agents   autonomy   computer modeling   computers and society   independence   levels of abstraction   sociotechnical systems
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DOI 10.1007/s10676-008-9174-6
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Autonomous Weapons and Distributed Responsibility.Marcus Schulzke - 2013 - Philosophy and Technology 26 (2):203-219.
Artificial Moral Agents Are Infeasible with Foreseeable Technologies.Patrick Chisan Hew - 2014 - Ethics and Information Technology 16 (3):197-206.

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