How should philosophy be clear? Loaded clarity, default clarity, and Adorno

Telos: Critical Theory of the Contemporary 2009 (146):73–95 (2009)

Authors
Nicholas Joll
University of Essex (PhD)
Abstract
[First paragraph:] Part of the point of this article is to support the following claim by Adorno: “Rarely has anyone laid out a theory of philosophical clarity; instead, the concept of clarity has been used as though it were self-evident.” In fact, and again with Adorno, I shall argue for what I call the “loadedness thesis”: the thesis that philosophical conceptions of clarity are pervasively, and perhaps inevitably, philosophically partisan (section one). Yet I shall proceed to argue for a conception of clarity nonetheless (section two). Such clarity I take as “default clarity,” in that, while there could be reason to eschew it, the burden of proof lies on those who would. That thought is not Adornian. But I shall consider Adorno as an attempt to discharge that burden of proof (section three).
Keywords Adorno  Clarity  Metaphilosophy
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DOI 10.3817/0309146073
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References found in this work BETA

Kierkegaard: Construction of the Aesthetic.Robert L. Perkins - 1990 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 48 (3):262-263.

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Citations of this work BETA

Adorno’s Negative Dialectic: Theme, Point, and Methodological Status.Nicholas Joll - 2009 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 17 (2):233–53.

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