Authors
Nicholas K. Jones
University of Birmingham
Abstract
This paper uses the resources of higher-order logic to articulate a Fregean conception of predicate reference, and of word-world relations more generally, that is immune to the concept horse problem. The paper then addresses a prominent style of expressibility problem for views of broadly this kind, versions of which are due to Linnebo, Hale, and Wright.
Keywords Higher-order logic  Concept horse problem  Predicate reference
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DOI 10.3998/ergo.12405314.0003.006
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References found in this work BETA

Modal Logic as Metaphysics.Timothy Williamson - 2013 - Oxford University Press.
The Things We Mean.Stephen Schiffer - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
The Frege Reader.Gottlob Frege & Michael Beaney (eds.) - 1997 - Blackwell.
Everything.Timothy Williamson - 2003 - Philosophical Perspectives 17 (1):415–465.

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Citations of this work BETA

Why Did Frege Reject the Theory of Types?Wim Vanrie - forthcoming - British Journal for the History of Philosophy.
Propositions and Cognitive Relations.Nicholas K. Jones - 2019 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 119 (2):157-178.
Denoting and Disquoting.Michael Rieppel - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (3):548-561.

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The Concept Horse with No Name.Robert Trueman - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1889-1906.

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