General relativity and the standard model: Why evidence for one does not disconfirm the other

Abstract
General Relativity and the Standard Model often are touted as the most rigorously and extensively confirmed scientific hypotheses of all time. Nonetheless, these theories appear to have consequences that are inconsistent with evidence about phenomena for which, respectively, quantum effects and gravity matter. This paper suggests an explanation for why the theories are not disconfirmed by such evidence. The key to this explanation is an approach to scientific hypotheses that allows their actual content to differ from their apparent content. This approach does not appeal to ceteris-paribus qualifiers or counterfactuals or similarity relations. And it helps to explain why some highly idealized hypotheses are not treated in the way that a thoroughly refuted theory is treated but instead as hypotheses with limited domains of applicability.
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DOI 10.1016/j.shpsb.2008.10.004
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Twilight of the Perfect Model Model.Paul Teller - 2001 - Erkenntnis 55 (3):393-415.
The Non-Uniqueness of Semantic Solutions: Polysemy. [REVIEW]Geoffrey Nunberg - 1979 - Linguistics and Philosophy 3 (2):143 - 184.

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Don't Blame the Idealizations.Nicholaos Jones - 2013 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 44 (1):85-100.

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