Authors
Nicholaos Jones
University of Alabama, Huntsville
Abstract
ABSTRACT There is a new argument form within theoretical biology. This form takes as input competing explanatory models; it yields as output the conclusion that one of these models is more plausible than the others. The driving force for this argument form is an analysis showing that one model exhibits more parametric robustness than its competitors. This article examines these inferences to the more robust explanation, analysing them as variants of inference to the best explanation. The article defines parametric robustness and distinguishes it from more familiar kinds of robustness. The article also argues that parametric robustness is an explanatory virtue not subsumed by more familiar explanatory virtues, and that the plausibility verdicts in the conclusions of inferences to the more robust explanations are best interpreted as guidance for research activity, rather than claims about likely truth. 1Introducing Inference to the More Robust Explanation 2Inference to the More Robust Explanation in the Study of Apoptosis 2.1Regulating apoptosis 2.2Competing models and evidential indecision 2.3Measuring robustness 2.4Robustness as a guide to plausibility 2.5Varieties of robustness 3Inference to the More Robust Explanation as Inference to the Best Explanation 3.1The structure of inference to the best explanation 3.2Parametric robustness as an explanatory virtue rather than an explanandum 3.3Relation of parametric robustness to other explanatory virtues 4Epistemological Significance of Inference to the More Robust Explanation 4.1Plausibility in practice 4.2Plausibility in principle 5Conclusion
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1093/bjps/axw009
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 64,132
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Inference to the Best Explanation.Peter Lipton - 1991 - London and New York: Routledge/Taylor and Francis Group.
The Inference to the Best Explanation.Gilbert H. Harman - 1965 - Philosophical Review 74 (1):88-95.
Inference to the Best Explanation.Peter Lipton - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2):421-423.
The Best Explanation: Criteria for Theory Choice.Paul R. Thagard - 1978 - Journal of Philosophy 75 (2):76-92.
Robustness Analysis.Michael Weisberg - 2006 - Philosophy of Science 73 (5):730-742.

View all 18 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Non-Empirical Robustness Arguments in Quantum Gravity.Niels S. Linnemann - 2020 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 72:70-86.
What Is Bayesian Confirmation For?Darren Bradley - 2017 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 31 (3):229-241.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Robustness Analysis.Michael Weisberg - 2006 - Philosophy of Science 73 (5):730-742.
Explanation and Epistemology.William G. Lycan - 2002 - In Paul K. Moser (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 413.
Default Privilege and Bad Lots: Underconsideration and Explanatory Inference.Kareem Khalifa - 2010 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24 (1):91 – 105.
Some Varieties of Robustness.James Woodward - 2006 - Journal of Economic Methodology 13 (2):219-240.
The Functions of Fossils: Inference and Explanation in Functional Morphology.D. Turner - 2000 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 31 (1):193-212.
Model Robustness as a Confirmatory Virtue: The Case of Climate Science.Elisabeth A. Lloyd - 2015 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 49:58-68.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2016-05-20

Total views
81 ( #134,232 of 2,454,729 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
4 ( #179,601 of 2,454,729 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes