Philosophical Explorations 9 (1):45-53 (2006)
Prinz claims that empirical work on emotions and moral judgement can help us resolve longstanding metaethical disputes in favour of simple sentimentalism. I argue that the empirical evidence he marshals does not have the metaethical implications he claims: the studies purporting to show that having an emotion is sufficient for making a moral judgement are tendentiously described. We are entitled to ascribe competence with moral concepts to experimental subjects only if we suppose that they would withdraw their moral judgement on learning that they were fully explained by hypnotically induced disgust. Genuine moral judgements must be reason-responsive. To capture the reason-responsiveness of moral judgement, we must turn to either neo-sentimentalism or to a non-sentimentalist metaethics, either of which is fully compatible with the empirical evidence Prinz cites.
|Keywords||Emotion Ethics Metaethics Moral Judgment Sentimentalism Prinz, Jesse|
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References found in this work BETA
Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment.Allan Gibbard - 1990 - Harvard University Press.
Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Theory Acceptance in Ethics.Norman Daniels - 1979 - Journal of Philosophy 76 (5):256-282.
Citations of this work BETA
Thinking and Feeling: Moral Deliberation in a Dual-Process Framework.Jillian Craigie - 2011 - Philosophical Psychology 24 (1):53-71.
Educated Intuitions. Automaticity and Rationality in Moral Judgement.Hanno Sauer - 2012 - Philosophical Explorations 15 (3):255-275.
Psychopaths and Filthy Desks: Are Emotions Necessary and Sufficient for Moral Judgment?Hanno Sauer - 2012 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (1):95-115.
Emotion Education Without Ontological Commitment?Kristján Kristjánsson - 2010 - Studies in Philosophy and Education 29 (3):259-274.
Moral Cognition, Affect, and Psychopathy.Michelle Maiese - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (6):807-828.
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