Philosophical Explorations 9 (1):45-53 (2006)
AbstractPrinz claims that empirical work on emotions and moral judgement can help us resolve longstanding metaethical disputes in favour of simple sentimentalism. I argue that the empirical evidence he marshals does not have the metaethical implications he claims: the studies purporting to show that having an emotion is sufficient for making a moral judgement are tendentiously described. We are entitled to ascribe competence with moral concepts to experimental subjects only if we suppose that they would withdraw their moral judgement on learning that they were fully explained by hypnotically induced disgust. Genuine moral judgements must be reason-responsive. To capture the reason-responsiveness of moral judgement, we must turn to either neo-sentimentalism or to a non-sentimentalist metaethics, either of which is fully compatible with the empirical evidence Prinz cites.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
References found in this work
Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment.Allan Gibbard - 1990 - Harvard University Press.
Ruling Passions: A Theory of Practical Reasoning.Simon Blackburn - 1998 - Oxford University Press UK.
Citations of this work
Educated Intuitions. Automaticity and Rationality in Moral Judgement.Hanno Sauer - 2012 - Philosophical Explorations 15 (3):255-275.
Affective Scaffolds, Expressive Arts, and Cognition.Michelle Maiese - 2016 - Frontiers in Psychology 7.
Psychopaths and Filthy Desks: Are Emotions Necessary and Sufficient for Moral Judgment?Hanno Sauer - 2012 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (1):95-115.
Thinking and Feeling: Moral Deliberation in a Dual-Process Framework.Jillian Craigie - 2011 - Philosophical Psychology 24 (1):53-71.
Transformative Learning, Enactivism, and Affectivity.Michelle Maiese - 2017 - Studies in Philosophy and Education 36 (2):197-216.
Similar books and articles
Moral Emotions.Jesse J. Prinz & Shaun Nichols - 2010 - In John Michael Doris (ed.), The Moral Psychology Handbook. Oxford University Press. pp. 111.
How not to argue that morality isn't innate: Comments on Jesse Prinz's “is morality innate?”.Susan Dwyer - manuscript
What Makes a Sentiment Moral?Antti Kauppinen - 2010 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics vol. 5. Oxford University Press. pp. 225-256.
Neurosentimentalism and Moral Agency.Philip Gerrans & Jeanette Kennett - 2010 - Mind 119 (475):585-614.
Sentimentalist Pluralism: Moral Psychology and Philosophical Ethics.Michael B. Gill & Shaun Nichols - 2008 - Philosophical Issues 18 (1):143-163.