Philosophical Explorations 9 (1):45-53 (2006)

Authors
Karen Jones
University of Melbourne
Abstract
Prinz claims that empirical work on emotions and moral judgement can help us resolve longstanding metaethical disputes in favour of simple sentimentalism. I argue that the empirical evidence he marshals does not have the metaethical implications he claims: the studies purporting to show that having an emotion is sufficient for making a moral judgement are tendentiously described. We are entitled to ascribe competence with moral concepts to experimental subjects only if we suppose that they would withdraw their moral judgement on learning that they were fully explained by hypnotically induced disgust. Genuine moral judgements must be reason-responsive. To capture the reason-responsiveness of moral judgement, we must turn to either neo-sentimentalism or to a non-sentimentalist metaethics, either of which is fully compatible with the empirical evidence Prinz cites.
Keywords Emotion  Ethics  Metaethics  Moral Judgment  Sentimentalism  Prinz, Jesse
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1080/13869790500492508
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 50,556
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Wise Choices, Apt Feelings.Allan Gibbard - 1990 - Ethics 102 (2):342-356.

View all 24 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Moral Judgments and Emotions: A Less Intimate Relationship Than Recently Claimed.Thomas Pölzler - 2015 - Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 35 (3):177-195.
Reasons, Reflection, and Repugnance.Doug McConnell & Jeanette Kennett - 2016 - In Alberto Giubilini & Steve Clarke (eds.), The Ethics of Human Enhancement: Understanding the Debate. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

View all 18 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
229 ( #33,980 of 2,326,775 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #429,609 of 2,326,775 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes