Metaethics and emotions research: A response to Prinz

Philosophical Explorations 9 (1):45-53 (2006)
Abstract
Prinz claims that empirical work on emotions and moral judgement can help us resolve longstanding metaethical disputes in favour of simple sentimentalism. I argue that the empirical evidence he marshals does not have the metaethical implications he claims: the studies purporting to show that having an emotion is sufficient for making a moral judgement are tendentiously described. We are entitled to ascribe competence with moral concepts to experimental subjects only if we suppose that they would withdraw their moral judgement on learning that they were fully explained by hypnotically induced disgust. Genuine moral judgements must be reason-responsive. To capture the reason-responsiveness of moral judgement, we must turn to either neo-sentimentalism or to a non-sentimentalist metaethics, either of which is fully compatible with the empirical evidence Prinz cites.
Keywords Emotion  Ethics  Metaethics  Moral Judgment  Sentimentalism  Prinz, Jesse
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/13869790500492508
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 26,188
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Ruling Passions.Simon Blackburn - 1998 - Oxford University Press.
Impartial Reason.Stephen L. Darwall - 1983 - Cornell University Press.

View all 15 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Emotion Education Without Ontological Commitment?Kristján Kristjánsson - 2010 - Studies in Philosophy and Education 29 (3):259-274.
Moral Cognition, Affect, and Psychopathy.Michelle Maiese - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (6):807-828.

View all 13 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

178 ( #24,448 of 2,153,834 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

10 ( #67,202 of 2,153,834 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums