Philosophical Quarterly 70 (279):302-327 (2020)

Authors
Silvia Jonas
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München
Abstract
The existence of fundamental moral disagreements is a central problem for moral realism and has often been contrasted with an alleged absence of disagreement in mathematics. However, mathematicians do in fact disagree on fundamental questions, for example on which set-theoretic axioms are true, and some philosophers have argued that this increases the plausibility of moral vis-à-vis mathematical realism. I argue that the analogy between mathematical and moral disagreement is not as straightforward as those arguments present it. In particular, I argue that pluralist accounts of mathematics render fundamental mathematical disagreements compatible with mathematical realism in a way in which moral disagreements and moral realism are not. 11
Keywords disagreement  mathematical realism  moral realism  set-theoretic pluralism  multiverse  Continuum Hypothesis
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DOI 10.1093/pq/pqz057
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References found in this work BETA

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Wiley-Blackwell.
On What Matters: Two-Volume Set.Derek Parfit - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
Two Dogmas of Empiricism.Willard V. O. Quine - 1951 - Philosophical Review 60 (1):20–43.
Two Dogmas of Empiricism.W. Quine - 1951 - [Longmans, Green].

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The Ethics–Mathematics Analogy.Justin Clarke‐Doane - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (1).

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