Reductionist and anti-reductionist perspectives on dynamics

Philosophical Psychology 15 (4):381 – 409 (2002)
Abstract
In this paper, reduction and its pragmatics are discussed in light of the development in computer science of languages to describe processes. The design of higher-level description languages within computer science has had the aim of allowing for description of the dynamics of processes in the (physical) world on a higher level avoiding all (physical) details of these processes. The higher description levels developed have dramatically increased the complexity of applications that came within reach. The pragmatic attitude of a (scientific) practitioner in this area has become inherently anti-reductionist, but based on well-established reduction relations. The paper discusses how this perspective can be related to reduction in general, and to other domains where description of dynamics plays a main role, in particular, biological and cognitive domains.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/0951508021000041987
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 27,678
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Real Patterns.Daniel C. Dennett - 1991 - Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):27-51.

View all 9 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Explanation: A Mechanist Alternative.William Bechtel - 2005 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Biol and Biomed Sci 36 (2):421--441.
Explanation: A Mechanist Alternative.William Bechtel & Adele Abrahamsen - 2005 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 36 (2):421-441.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

23 ( #218,742 of 2,169,650 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

1 ( #345,417 of 2,169,650 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums