In "Bayesian Confirmation of Theories that Incorporate Idealizations", Michael Shaffer argues that, in order to show how idealized hypotheses can be confirmed, Bayesians must develop a coherent proposal for how to assign prior probabilities to counterfactual conditionals. This paper develops a Bayesian reply to Shaffer's challenge that avoids the issue of how to assign prior probabilities to counterfactuals by treating idealized hypotheses as abstract descriptions. The reply allows Bayesians to assign non-zero degrees of confirmation to idealized hypotheses and to capture the intuition that less idealized hypotheses tend to be better confirmed than their more idealized counterparts.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Pragmatic Idealization and Structuralist Reconstructions of Theories.Michaela Haase - 1996 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 27 (2):215-234.
Should Physicians Be Bayesian Agents?M. Wayne Cooper - 1992 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 13 (4).
The Bayesian Treatment of Auxiliary Hypotheses.Michael Strevens - 2001 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (3):515-537.
Idealization, Explanation, and Confirmation.Ronald Laymon - 1980 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1980:336 - 350.
Seeking Confirmation Is Rational for Deterministic Hypotheses.Joseph L. Austerweil & Thomas L. Griffiths - 2011 - Cognitive Science 35 (3):499-526.
Bayesian Decision Theory, Subjective and Objective Probabilities, and Acceptance of Empirical Hypotheses.John C. Harsanyi - 1983 - Synthese 57 (3):341 - 365.
Subjective Probabilities as Basis for Scientific Reasoning?Franz Huber - 2005 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (1):101-116.
Bayesian Confirmation and Auxiliary Hypotheses Revisited: A Reply to Strevens.Branden Fitelson & Andrew Waterman - 2005 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (2):293-302.
Bayesian Confirmation of Theories That Incorporate Idealizations.Michael J. Shaffer - 2001 - Philosophy of Science 68 (1):36-52.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads45 ( #116,167 of 2,172,025 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #325,967 of 2,172,025 )
How can I increase my downloads?