Philosophical Studies 173 (2):479-503 (2016)

Authors
Nicholas K. Jones
University of Birmingham
Abstract
This paper evaluates Stalnaker’s recent attempt to outline a realist interpretation of possible worlds semantics that lacks substantive metaphysical commitments. The limitations of his approach are used to draw some more general lessons about the non-representational artefacts of formal representations. Three key conclusions are drawn. Stalnaker’s account of possible worlds semantics’ non-representational artefacts does not cohere with his modal metaphysics. Invariance-based analyses of non-representational artefacts cannot capture a certain kind of artefact. Stalnaker must treat instrumentally those aspects of possible worlds formalism governing the interaction between quantification and modality, under any analysis whatsoever of non-representational artefacts
Keywords Stalnaker  Contingent existence  Possible worlds semantics  Invariance  Artefacts
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-015-0503-4
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References found in this work BETA

Modal Logic as Metaphysics.Timothy Williamson - 2013 - Oxford University Press.
Ways a World Might Be.Robert Stalnaker - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 133 (3):439 - 441.
Merely Possible Propositions.Robert Stalnaker - 2010 - In Bob Hale & Aviv Hoffmann (eds.), Modality: Metaphysics, Logic, and Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 21--32.

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Citations of this work BETA

Models and Reality.Robert Stalnaker - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (4-5):709-726.

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