Abstract
I reply to each of the contributions in this issue. I agree with much that Hillel Steiner argues, especially his insistence that the associated ideas of impartiality and discontinuity are crucial to dealing satisfactorily with a diversity of competing claims. I am, however, less willing to conceive provision for that diversity as the role, rather than a role, that we should ascribe to rights. I question the success of David Miller?s endeavour to provide a unified justification of human rights grounded in the concept of need. It is the notion of a minimally decent human life, rather than need itself, that does most of the justificatory work in Miller?s argument and, arguably, that notion does not deliver a genuinely unitary account of human rights. I concede the case for state funding of opera and the arts more generally to John Horton?s argument, but defend neutralism, and its associated distinction between the right and the good, as a strategy for dealing with diversity, including cultural diversity. I resist Richard Bellamy?s attempt to ground all basic rights in democracy and suggest that his argument relies upon idealized assumptions about the functioning of democracy. I share much of his objection to substituting judicial for political decision-making but argue that a strong moral commitment to rights need not imply a shift in power from democratic processes to courts. I endorse Albert Weale?s argument for favouring a beneficial design approach over a rights approach to healthcare and to many other social goods. Rights should not monopolize our moral and political thinking
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/13698230.2012.699400
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 50,447
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Political Liberalism.John Rawls - 1993 - Columbia University Press.
The Law of Peoples.John Rawls - 1999 - Harvard University Press.
Political Liberalism.J. Rawls - 1995 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 57 (3):596-598.

View all 15 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Conceptions of the Good, Rivalry, and Liberal Neutrality.Nick Martin - 2017 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 20 (2):143-162.
Conceptions of the Good, Rivalry, and Liberal Neutrality.Nick Martin - 2015 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy:1-20.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Human Rights and the Diversity of Value.Hillel Steiner - 2012 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 15 (4):395-406.
Rights as Democracy.Richard Bellamy - 2012 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 15 (4):449-471.
Human Rights and Human Well-Being.William Talbott - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
Human Rights, Individualism and Cultural Diversity.Rowan Cruft - 2005 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 8 (3):265-287.
Grounding Human Rights.David Miller - 2012 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 15 (4):407-427.
Collective Rights and Minority Rights.Seumas Miller - 2000 - International Journal of Applied Philosophy 14 (2):241-257.
The Non-Modularity of Moral Knowledge.Theresa Waynand Tobin - 2005 - Social Philosophy Today 21:33-50.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2012-08-08

Total views
15 ( #612,277 of 2,326,365 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #644,397 of 2,326,365 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes