Underdetermination and the explanation of theory-acceptance: A response to Samir Okasha

After a thorough examination of the claim that "the underdetermination of theory by evidence forces us to seek sociological explanations of scientists' cognitive choices", Samir Okasha concludes that the only significant problem with this argument is that the thesis of underdetermination is not adequately supported. Against Okasha, I argue (1) that there is a very good reason to question the inference from the underdetermination of a theory to a sociological account of that theory's acceptance, and (2) that Okasha's own objection to the argument is too weak.
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DOI 10.1080/026985900437791
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References found in this work BETA
Alvin Goldman (1976). Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge. Journal of Philosophy 73 (November):771-791.

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Citations of this work BETA
Samir Okasha (2000). The Explanation of Scientific Belief: Reply to W.E. Jones. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 14 (3):305 – 306.

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