Authors
Russell E. Jones
University of Oklahoma
Abstract
Plato’s Socrates is often thought to hold that wisdom or virtue is sufficient for happiness, and Euthydemus 278-282 is often taken to be the locus classicus for this sufficiency thesis in Plato’s dialogues. But this view is misguided: Not only does Socrates here fail to argue for, assert, or even implicitly assume the sufficiency thesis, but the thesis turns out to be hard to square with the argument he does give. I argue for an interpretation of the passage that explains the central importance of wisdom for Socrates without committing him to the sufficiency thesis. The result is that the Euthydemus displays a plausible but distinctively Socratic argument for making the pursuit of wisdom the central concern of one’s life
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Platonic Know‐How and Successful Action.Tamer Nawar - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (4):944-962.
Plato on Well-Being.Eric Brown - 2016 - In Guy Fletcher (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Well-Being. London, UK: pp. 9-19.

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