Which is to blame: Instrumental rationality, or common knowledge?

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (2):166-167 (2003)

Matt Jones
University of Manchester
Normative analysis in game-theoretic situations requires assumptions regarding players' expectations about their opponents. Although the assumptions entailed by the principle of common knowledge are often violated, available empirical evidence – including focal point selection and violations of backward induction – may still be explained by instrumentally rational agents operating under certain mental models of their opponents.
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DOI 10.1017/S0140525X03360054
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